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Abstract
In the era of the information society, it is important to secure systems against security breaches.
To understand and model such security breaches, the concept of abuse cases has been
introduced. While the extant research on abuse cases offer important insights into secure systems
design, these approaches do not offer (a) empirical evidence on their usefulness and relevance in
practice, (b) means to prioritize security requirements, (c) explicit support for designing
countermeasures, and (d) explicit support for integrating a risk management process into abuse
cases. In this paper, we refine an extended abuse case model developed in our earlier research
to address these four issues. This approach is then tested in practice with action research. The
action research experience demonstrates that the refined approach was useful and easy to embed
into information systems development methods in practice.
Keywords: IS security, secure systems design, abuse cases, misuse cases

1. Introduction
Modern society is increasingly based on information processing and global networks. IS security
is a vital and a growing concern in such an IT-based society. Critical information regarding, for
instance, health care, banking and telecommunication must be secured. To ensure that
information systems (IS) are secured, several methods for the development of secure information
systems have been provided. While information security standards and checklists, such as SSECMM or BS7799, are the most commonly used IS security methods (Mattia and Dhillon 2003;
Siponen 2003), they do not provide any guidance on how to model security requirements.
Therefore, to model IS security requirements and constraints, approaches like the Logical
Modeling method (Baskerville 1989), Responsibility Modeling (Backhouse and Dhillon 1996),
Meta-Notation (Siponen and Baskerville 2001), and UMLsec (Jürjens 2002; Popp et al. 2003)
have been proposed (see review articles by Baskerville 1993; Dhillon and Backhouse 2001;
Siponen 2005; Villarroel et al. 2005).
To capture and model systems’ unauthorized use, McDermott and Fox (1999) introduced the
concept of abuse cases. While use cases illustrate systems use, abuse cases are used to
understand unauthorized use. Later, similar ideas, termed “misuse cases” (Sindre and Opdahl
2000), were introduced. While these two abuse case approaches (McDermott and Fox 1999;
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Sindre and Opdahl 2000) provided seminal insights into the designing of secure systems and
software, these approaches do not offer (a) empirical evidence on their usefulness and relevance
in practice, (b) means to prioritize security requirements, (c) explicit support for designing
countermeasures and (d) explicit support for integrating a risk management process into abuse
cases. To address these concerns, we refine an extended abuse case model (Siponen et al. 2005)
that addresses these issues, and then test it in practice with action research.
This paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the existing abuse case
approaches, and demonstrates how these four weaknesses pertain in these methods. The extended
model is introduced in the third section. The fourth section introduces the research methods and
the fifth section presents the action research results. In the sixth, section we discuss the validity
of the research and the last section presents the conclusions.

2. Existing Research on Abuse and Misuse Cases
The existing abuse case approaches are: abuse cases by McDermott and Fox (1999), and misuse
cases by Sindre and Opdahl (2000). While use cases model a system’s authorized use, abuse
cases model a system’s unauthorized use. The idea is to understand potential threats to IS, which
can range from a hacker’s organized denial of service attacks to employees attempting to access
an unauthorized file. Like use cases, abuse case descriptions can be graphical or textual. While
abuse cases by McDermott and Fox (1999) are graphical, concentrating on abuse case notations
and diagrams, Sindre and Opdahl (2000) consider it more important to produce textual versions
of abuse cases. The other difference between these two is that McDermott and Fox (1999)
recommend the modeling of the abuse case scenarios separately from use case diagrams, while
Sindre and Opdahl (2000) suggest modeling the abuse in the same diagram as normal uses, to
indicate the link between user, abuser, and system resources.
Next we describe how these abuse case approaches (McDermott and Fox 1999; Sindre and
Opdahl 2000) entail the four weaknesses: lack of empirical evidence on their usefulness and
relevance in practice, lack of explicit support for designing countermeasures, lack of support for
integrating risk management process into abuse cases and lack of means to prioritize security
requirements.
2.1 Lack of Empirical Evidence
An important feature of any IS security method is empirical evidence, demonstrating the
method’s usefulness in organizations. Both of the existing abuse case approaches (McDermott
and Fox 1999; Sindre and Opdahl 2000) lack empirical evidence evaluating the approach in an
industrial setting. According to Sindre and Opdahl “the serious weakness of this work is that it
has not been evaluated in practical software development projects” (Sindre and Opdahl 2000, p.
130). Alexander (2002) provides initial experiences of the use of abuse cases in trade-off
analysis, but the study lacks evidence of using abuse cases as part of the software design process,
which is important to overcome developmental duality (Baskerville 1992). An abuse case
approach should not only be designed such that it can be integrated into requirement analysis of
IS and software development, but the integration of abuse cases with IS and the software
development process should include the linking of abuse cases to all relevant documents in the
development process.
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The existing abuse case studies (Alexander 2002; Alexander 2003; Hope et al. 2004; McDermott
and Fox 1999; McDermott 2001; Pauli and Xu 2005; Sindre and Opdahl 2000; Sindre and
Opdahl 2001) provide only weak evidence or no evidence of integration of the abuse cases with
IS and the software development process. Both abuse case approaches (McDermott and Fox,
1999; Sindre and Opdahl 2000) discuss the exploitation of abuse cases in some phases of the
software development process, but do not provide information on how their model can be
integrated systematically into different phases of IS development. According to McDermott and
Fox (1999, p. 63): “abuse case models can be helpful during the requirements, design, and
testing phases of a security engineering process.” Sindre and Opdahl (2001) present some ideas
as to how abuse cases can be used in different development phases, but, as they stated, it is
important “to investigate how misuse case analysis can be integrated with existing RE
(requirement engineering) methods and techniques.” As can be seen from these extracts, it is not
clear how these two abuse case approaches should be integrated with IS or the software
development process to overcome developmental duality.
2.2 Support for Designing Countermeasures
The sequence of abuse cases and abuse case countermeasures are other important features for
abuse case scenarios. While the abuse case template by Sindre and Opdahl (2000) introduces
useful text fields, such as preconditions, assumptions, abuser profiles, and stakeholder threats,
their template does not contain any fields for the sequence of abuse cases (how the abuse might
be carried out) or countermeasures (how the abuse can be prevented). It is important that the
countermeasures are included in the abuse case template, so that the whole development team,
including IS developers and security experts, can participate in the analysis of security
requirements and potential countermeasures.
According to White and Dhillon (2005) in many IS development projects, the security design
teams and IS development teams are two separate groups, with differing development methods
and objectives in systems development. In extreme cases little communication exists between
these two teams; the IS being built by the systems developers and security solutions being added
later by security experts. This often leads to an IS that is not properly secured and unable to be
effectively used in the environment. (Baskerville 1992; White and Dhillon 2005.)
The abuse case approaches by McDermott and Fox (1999) and Sindre and Opdahl (2000) do not
highlight the countermeasures; this is important in communication between different
stakeholders (IS developers, security experts, clients, etc.). In specifying effective
countermeasures, every team member’s contribution should be sought. In this way, developer
groups can form a common design plan, and the client can see what assets are in danger if the
countermeasure is not effective or is not implemented. Also, by presenting the potential
countermeasures in abuse cases, the developers will be able to notice if the same
countermeasures can be used against many security threats. In the case of tracking abuse, the
potential countermeasure could be the use of log files which could also be used to show nonrepudiation, for example in an eCommerce application. In that case it would be economical to
implement the specific security feature. If the countermeasure is broken down into smaller steps,
a sequence diagram describing countermeasure mechanisms can be drawn.
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2.3 Prioritization and Risk Management
The ability to prioritize security requirements is important in the industry. It is very common that
software is developed in several software development cycles or releases, where the most
important features are handled first and the other requirements in later releases. Thus, it is very
important that the requirements, including security requirements, can be prioritized.
The existing abuse case approaches (McDermott and Fox 1999; Sindre and Opdahl 2000) do not
address the prioritization aspect. In addition, when the development is carried out in several
development releases (Baskerville et al. 2003), the developers should be informed in which
version or release the abuse case is prevented (i.e., the countermeasure is implemented), so that
the correct functioning of the countermeasure can be verified. It is also important to manage the
development risks during requirement trade-offs and prioritization. The existing abuse case
approaches do not entail explicit risk management processes.
To summarize, an abuse case approach should cover all security relevant aspects of development
to improve communication between stakeholders in order to overcome the developmental
duality, offer means to prioritize security requirements, highlight countermeasures, and integrate
a risk management process into abuse cases.

3. Extended Abuse Cases
To overcome these shortcomings presented in the company, we crafted the abuse case model in
our earlier research (cf., Siponen et al. 2005). We used this as a point of departure in the action
research settings and integrated the fine-tuned model into company’s IS development process.
Table 1 provides an example of an extended abuse case approach.
Table 1. An example of an extended abuse case template. The fields marked with * are derived
from the risk analysis process of Saltmarsh and Browne (1983).
Abuse case
Priority *
Frequency *
Total cost of
recovering *
Abuse subject
Preconditions
Outcome
Description and
countermeasure *

What is the goal of this abuse case?
For example, a hacker is hacking into the system.
For example: high / medium / low
How often does this threat occur? Daily? Monthly?
What is the cost of recovering from the threat when it occurs? This information
can be used in the prioritization of security requirements and abuse cases.
Who is the abuser? What is his motivation?
For example: hacker (unauthorized), malicious employee (authorized)
What are the preconditions for the abuse to take place? What is the state of the
system at the beginning of the abuse? For example: “a hacker tries to break into
the locked system by guessing a user’s password.”
What is the outcome of the abuse? What state is the system in after this abuse
case?
Describe how the system reacts to the abuse and how the abuse target is secured.
The sensitive information which needs to be secured can be recognized from this
description. For example: in login, the system allows three login attempts and if
these fail, the account is locked.
1. A hacker feeds in the passwords and user ID
2. The system checks the password and the used ID (security requirement SR-01)
3. The hacker…
4. The system…
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Used to describe alternative scenarios and exceptions.
2a. …the rule for how the system discovers the extension
- Describe how the extension is handled

Data

Requirements
Test cases
Version
Other issues

2b. …the rule for how the system discovers the extension
- Describe how the extension is handled
What data is manipulated in this abuse case – for example, what classes? If there
are messages between systems list the messages or references to messages here.
Testing necessitates that the data manipulated (for example the password and user
ID) in the abuse case is described here. In the case of unauthorized access to
address data the data could be: first name, last name, street address, zip code, city,
etc. This information helps the testing phase.
References to requirements in the requirement catalog that are relevant to this
abuse case.
References to test cases relevant to this abuse case or the countermeasures
described.
In which version or release is the countermeasure completed? After that the
functioning of the countermeasure can be tested.
Other issues related to this abuse case.

In order that security aspects can be integrated into software and IS development methods, it is
important that the security features are taken care of in each phase of software development
(Baskerville 1989; Baskerville 1992). This means that the security requirements and features
should be specified systematically, for example, by using this approach. Furthermore, the
specified security requirements have to be linked logically through the software development
process.
In Table 1, the relevant functional and security requirements are linked to the abuse case to
emphasize the connection of security and functional requirements. The documents that are
utilized after specifying abuse cases (e.g., class descriptions and diagrams, sequence diagrams,
security plan, architectural designs, technical manual) are also linked to abuse cases to ensure
that security requirements are handled carefully in the development process. To cover the whole
development process, we also linked the abuse cases to the relevant test cases. In the modeling of
abuse cases and security requirements, we modified Sindre and Opdahl’s (2000) original
notation (Fig. 1).

Figure 1. The abuse case diagram. Abuse is expressed by using black (Alexander 2003).
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To highlight the countermeasures, we extended the abuse case description with the abuse
sequence (Description and countermeasure in Table 1). The purpose of the sequence is to clarify
the countermeasures by describing the steps in which attention should be paid to the security
issues and requirements. While it might not be possible to divide every abuse case into a simple
sequence of steps, this should be done when possible to help support the next phases of software
development, for example, the construction of a sequence diagram or test case of the
countermeasure.
To solve the risk management concern, we decided to integrate the five-phased process modified
from Saltmarsh and Browne (1983) into the abuse cases (demonstrated with * in Table 1). In this
way we can use abuse cases 1) to identify risks and 2) to calculate what damage the abuse might
cause. Furthermore, we can 3) evaluate how often the abuse will probably happen and 4) assess
how the risk can be minimized. Then, using the above-mentioned information we can 5) evaluate
the relevance of countermeasures. This information can be also used in the prioritization of
security requirements (e.g., it is not reasonable to spend €10000 to protect assets worth €1000).
After presentation of the research methodology, we test and refine our extended version of the
abuse case through action research in the fifth section.

4. Research Methodology
Action research has been advocated as ideal for studying IS development
methods in their practical settings (Avison et al. 2001; Baskerville and WoodHarper 1996; Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998; Baskerville 1999). By putting
theories to work in practice, not only is the scientific knowledge expanded,
but concrete problems are also solved in the participating organizations
(Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998). It is therefore no wonder that action
research studies examining the relevance of IS security methods in practice
have been recently called for by IS security scholars (Baskerville 1994;
Baskerville and Myers 2004; Dhillon and Backhouse 2001). Action research is a
form of field intervention consisting of four phases: diagnosis, action planning,
action taking and evaluation.
Baskerville and Wood-Harper (1998) have proposed seven validity criteria for information
systems action research: (1) the research should be set in multivariate social situations; (2) the
observations should be recorded and analyzed in an interpretive frame; (3) researcher actions
intervene in the research setting; (4) the method of data collection includes participatory
observation; (5) changes in the social setting are studied; (6) the immediate problem in the social
setting must have been resolved during the research; and (7) the research should illuminate a
theoretical framework that explains how the actions led to a favorable outcome. These criteria
are applied to evaluate the results of the action research intervention.

5. Action Research Intervention
The action research intervention was carried out in a large software company operating in
Finland, during the year 2005. The company uses in-house IS development methods and Unified
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Modeling Language (UML) in their IS development. The goal of the research was to provide a
new approach to the developers for the handling of security requirements in IS development.
In the diagnosis phase, we interviewed six employees from the organization (head designer, IT
chief, software architect, software engineer, method specialists, project manager) to gain
knowledge about the current situation regarding security issues in IS development. Prior to the
research project, the company used checklists and separate security instructions in the IS
development process. During the interviews the practitioners pointed out two problems in the
existing development process. First, the organization lacked a systematic approach for handling
security requirements. According to the software architect, “in the current approach we are not
sufficiently methodical… if the client does not emphasize the importance of security it might go
by the board.” Another developer stated: “The problem seems to be that the development teams
by themselves do not see what kinds of risks the use of the system causes. Rarely, if ever, do the
developers consider how critical the systems are, what the actual risks are, and what kind of
information security it would be important to invest in.” Second, while separate instructions
exist, the developers did not use these since they were not integrated in the actual software
development process. The chief developer described this situation: “The development method
does not have integrated security instructions for design or implementation of information
systems, but the instructions are separate and the use of them is not supervised.”
In the action planning phase, we held discussions with the developers and we proposed our
extended abuse cases to overcome the identified problems. The developers agreed that the
extended abuse cases would solve the problems. The developers wanted to standardize the
extended abuse cases with the use cases used in the company. According to one developer, “the
metaphors should be same in the normal use cases as in the abuse cases.” We decided to
combine the extended abuse template with the company’s use case template to form a template
to fulfill the company’s needs.
In the action taking phase, we integrated the abuse cases into the software development method
in three action research cycles. In the first cycle, we integrated the abuse cases into the
requirement analysis phase. At the end of the first integration cycle, the developers reviewed and
provided comments on the construction. The company exploited user scenarios in the early
phases of requirement analysis, and the technology chief suggested that “it would be good also
to have negative / abuse scenarios that are easy to understand that can be used in
communication with clients’ top management.” The abuse scenarios were added in the second
cycle. The abuse scenarios can be used as a basis for abuse cases to identify security threats
(abusers and their actions) at a high level. Later these scenarios can be used in the prioritization
of security requirements. This way the client can state their opinion about the identified threats,
focus financial resources on the most critical development targets and make a reasoned trade-off
if necessary. In the third cycle, we concentrated on the linking of abuse cases to all phases
throughout the whole system development process. After the cycles, the developers reviewed the
security-enriched method. They requested a process (Fig. 2) which maps the action carried out in
each phase.
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Figure 2. Process for exploitation of abuse cases in IS development.
In the evaluation phase, a group of developers tested the abuse scenarios and cases. The
developers started the testing by creating abuse scenarios which were prioritized using weighted
mean values. In this phase, some of the abuse scenarios were discarded because the development
team found out that these threats were irrelevant. Next the developers created an abuse case
diagram, but they felt that the original versions (McDermott and Fox 1999; Sindre and Opdahl
2000) did not emphasize the countermeasures. The developers, together with the researchers,
solved the problem by adding an extra color to the diagram to highlight the countermeasures
(yellow). In addition, we decided to divide the diagram (Fig. 3) into three different zones: use
cases (left), abuse cases (right), and countermeasures (middle).
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Use Cases

Countermeasures

Security Threats

Net Store
Order illegally

Change Password
<<pr

Login

<<uses>>
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>

Place an order
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ts>>

Check passwords
policy

Steal user ID and
password

Cracker

<<
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>>

Monitor log files

Use easy-to-guess
passwords
<<prevents>>

Validate item list

Administrator

<<uses>>

Update item list

Manipulate item
list

Add new items

Unmotivated Administrator

Figure 3. An example of an extended abuse case diagram. The countermeasures are highlighted
in yellow and the abuse cases in red.
By using these extensions, developers could form a summary of the requirement analysis phase
in which the whole development team could see the functionality, security threats related to these
functions, and countermeasures, at a glance. In addition, the developers saw the need to
crosscheck the different requirements to ensure that all critical parts of the IS are covered with
the necessary security controls (Table 2). In this way, the development team, including IS
developers and security experts, can communicate with each other and achieve a shared design
which reduces the gap between different objectives.
Table 2. The matrix of use and abuse cases and their “access” to IS resources.
Use case 1
Abuse case 1

Resource x

Abuse case 2

User
ID
password

Use case 2
and

Use case 3

…

Order information
Resource y

Abuse case 3
…

In the testing of the new approach, the developers found the abuse scenarios and the extended
abuse cases very useful in practice. For example, the software developer described this situation
as follows: “Abuse scenarios can be used to picture the operational environment such that we
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can prioritize the security requirements later in the development process. Thinking about
security threats gives an overview of security mechanisms which helps later phases.” Extended
abuse cases were easy to learn and easy to use. For instance, the software developer stated:
“There is no noticeable difference in using abuse cases [compared to normal use cases].” The
developers also found that the approach helps in the analysis, design and testing of security
requirements. As a developer described it, “abuse cases help requirement analysis and link the
defined requirements to the design. In the design phase we can model technical aspects of the
countermeasures. […] The approach is also useful in testing phase – it can be used to cover
areas that normal test cases do not cover.”

6. Discussion: Validity of Research
The research in this part of the thesis conforms to the seven validity
criteria for IS action research (Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998). First, the
research was set in a multivariate social situation involving intricate
relationships and communication between different stakeholders in the
development project. The company was lacking a methodological approach for the
handling of their clients’ security requirements. Second, the observations
and interviews were recorded and analyzed in an interpretive frame. This data
and the interpretation have been provided in the text. Third, the researchers
actively intervened, working directly with the developers to introduce the new
approach (extended abuse cases) into their practices. Fourth, the method of
data collection included participatory observation as well as interviews. The
observations were made both during the integration of abuse cases as well as
during the exploitation of extended abuse cases in empirical testing. Fifth,
the developers assessed reviews of the usability and success of the extended
abuse case approach. Sixth, the immediate problem in the research was resolved
(integration of extended abuse cases) during the research, according to the
evaluation of the collaborators. Finally, the actions in the setting were
tightly linked to the extended abuse case framework. This framework defined
the actions and explains how the actions led to the positive outcome.

7. Conclusions
In the era of the information society, it is important to secure information systems against
security breaches. To understand and model such security breaches, the concept of abuse cases
has been introduced. While the extant abuse case approaches offer important insights into secure
systems design, these approaches do not offer (a) empirical evidence on their usefulness and
relevance in practice, (b) means to prioritize security requirements, (c) explicit support for
designing countermeasures, and (d) explicit support for integrating a risk management process
into abuse cases. To address these concerns, we refined an extended abuse case model (Siponen
et al. 2005) and the abuse case notation (Sindre and Opdahl 2000). This approach is then tested
and refined in practice through an action research. The action research experience demonstrates
that the refined approach was useful and easy to embed into information systems development
methods in practice.
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